

of the American mind. "We may have exhausted our capacity for surprise and delight when we watched children in Tiananmen Square quoting Jefferson and children in East Berlin taking pick-axes to the Berlin Wall as East German guards smiled for the camera."

Neither surprise nor delight is required by those who have to do with Gorbachev and Gorbachevism. On the other hand, those emotions are the logical reactions of people who have become eyeless in the Gaza of Mikhail Gorbachev. And the danger is that once the passing delight and surprise are over, when cold reality sets in, the spiritual blindness and the chains of this moral prison holding down the human spirit will finally become too much. Men may well be tempted to shake and topple the very pillars of their material and earthly confinement and thus perish, unless a loving Father of all creatures still loves man so much that he will not abandon man in his self-made secularist prison and the darkness of his own unaided mind.

"All has been foreseen by God," John Paul comments. "The Father of all of us has arranged human affairs so that they end with man being saved from himself." For today men do need such a saving. "The growing secularism tends to obscure more and more and ultimately to negate man's natural creaturely values . . . which God's redemptive plan recognizes and empowers." Without those values, human society would disintegrate.

## 19. Forces of the "New Order": The Two Models of a Geopolitical House

In the shifting ground of human affairs today, the most surprising new contours are provided by two leaders, John Paul II and Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev appears as the active agent of changes to which the West is reacting, while John Paul II gives all the impression of one who,

not in mere reaction, is riding herd over these active and reactive participants. Why these two leaders should be able to exercise these key functions is a source of puzzlement to those who are not aware of the two men's importance; and to those who sometimes fail to appraise correctly and appreciate the reason for their prominence.

These two men are the only two among world leaders who not only head geopolitical institutions but have geopolitical aims. Geopolitics is their business. Now, the precise nature of the shift in world affairs is geopolitical. Alone among leaders, these two men have firsthand acquaintance with the geopolitical. But for the vast majority of onlookers and for many in government, geopolitics is merely a way of speaking about the mutual relationship of different systems of politics. Thus, the gargantuan change being effected in the shifting ground escapes them.

The term "geopolitics" is a relatively recent invention. It is composed of two Greek words, meaning "earth" and "political system," which the ancient Greeks never combined.

Those Greeks were very aware of the relations between different states and nations, each with its own political system, each being what the Greeks called a *politeia*. They saw all of these as constituting a loosely connected arrangement of differing political entities. Whether the relationships between them were based on peaceful trading or on signed alliances and associations, or on subjugation and imperial domination, the Greeks' fundamental notion of internationalism was that it involved different politically structured systems. One state, one *politeia*, might dominate several others. Several states might group together in offensive and defensive alliances or in straight commercial and industrial partnership. But there never was a moment when the same political structure was accepted and established in what originally were politically different states. Nobody ever proposed that the same *politeia* be shared freely by the different states and nations.

This was the limited extent of their internationalism. Late in their history, some few individuals lauded and tried to practice the ideal of the *cosmopolitis*, the citizen of the world, the individual who felt "at home" in any and every one of the political systems of the day. But this was seen as an individual whimsey, a romantic and somewhat exotic experience, not as a desirable condition of mankind in general, and certainly not as embodying a political ideal to be striven for. They never even conceived of a *cosmopoliteia*. They never conjoined a word for "earth" or "world" with the word for "political system."

Until the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, this internationalism provided the only framework within which relationships between different nations and states were considered.

Sometime in the nineteenth century, the term "geopolitics" was coined by non-Greeks. By then, the constituent elements—states and nations—of internationalism had changed. For one thing, men could now speak of the whole of earth, the whole world, and all nations in it. Exploration had covered the face of the globe. For another, enormous commercial empires—British, French, Ottoman, Austrian, German, Dutch, Russian, Chinese—and some minor ones—Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Japanese—dominated the world scene, cornering the raw power of earth's resources and the financial hegemony derived therefrom. The United States, neither a minor power nor a commercial empire in that society of nations, was still in the last stages of its own formation. Not until Woodrow Wilson boarded the *George Washington* for post-World War I Europe did the United States begin to flex genuinely internationalist muscles.

In this world situation, there had been born a certain homogeneity and overall standardization among nations and states. International relationships were more complex than ever before. Writers, thinkers and politicians, as well as bankers and economists, did think of that world as a loosely coagulated system of states regulated in their mutual relationships by some very generalized and generally observed rules of conduct. For a minute number of the very privileged classes, there was indeed a more developed form of the old Greek cosmopolitanism, but it remained an exoticism.

When the term "geopolitics" was used in reference to that world system, it implied the complex of relationships between all those world-spanning national interests and the "games" nations played, *Kriegspiel* and *Staatspiel*, the maintenance of peace and the conduct of statecraft in peacetime. Their peacetime was always defined in terms of an enemy. War was merely the conduct of statecraft and diplomacy in a more forthright way with that enemy. As the French cynically put it: *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*

Because the monopolies in trade and finance as well as military might rested in the hands of the Great Powers, "geopolitics" was also used to include the relationships between all minor and major powers. That network of relationships—reproducing the internationalism of the ancient Greeks in a more sophisticated and definitely worldwide ambit—was built and maintained with one end in view: the balance of power

between the Greats, and between their allies among the Minors. The clashes, economic, cultural, military, between the members of that international society concerned the pride of placement, and hegemony either in one part of the globe—Great Britain in Europe, Turkey in the Middle East—or internationally, say, in overall financial clout or naval supremacy on the seven seas.

Fundamentally, nothing had really changed since the Greeks. Internationalism had as its basic unit the individual *politeia* rooted in a particular state or nation, whether that was imperial Britain, republican France, democratic America or tiny protectorates like Sierra Leone or Sarawak. In a genuine, if limited, sense, the whole could be described as geopolitical; the word included all the political systems all over the earth.

Along that road of twenty centuries from the Greeks to modern times, there had been only two instances when the thought and concrete goals of some men went beyond this notion and practice of internationalism and approached the point where the reality of "earth" and "one political system" could be conjoined in one word.

The first in time was clearly enunciated and targeted as goal and ideal by a group of men and women who started off in the twilight of Greek civilization as the ragtag association of fishermen, servants, slaves, small merchants, dirt farmers, artisans and laborers—Jews and non-Jews—whom their enemies derisively called "Christians." That name stuck. In the first days of their existence in and around Jerusalem, their self-description was of "one community with one heart and one soul, and holding all possessions in common."

One of their earliest leaders in the first century of this second millennium, Paul of Tarsus, scrutinized the microcosm of nationalities and kingdoms, religions and cultures around him, and formulated the Christian refinement of the then regnant internationalism. He used his usual brilliant eloquence in doing this, but necessarily in terms of what he knew in his day as the society of nations. And, although the farthest west he personally ever reached was Spain, the farthest east and north was Greece and Turkey, the farthest south was Arabia, he spoke for all nations and peoples of the human race.

"You must now realize," he wrote to the inhabitants of Colossae, a town located in what is now the Denizli province of western Turkey, "that you have become new men on account of the enlightenment you now have about your Creator and his preferred world, in which there is to be no distinction between Jew and non-Jew, Jewish Christian and

Gentile Christian, fellow citizen and foreigner, known and unknown people, slave and freeman. For, now, Christ is all of us, and Christ is in all of us." Paul's inventory of differences and divisions that separated the people of his day into different and warring systems and groups finds exact parallels in our modern society of nations, states and peoples. According to Paul, all differences and divisions have been transcended by a new unity.

Nor was Paul speaking of a purely spiritual unity. He was laying down a blueprint for a new society of peoples and nations undivided by nationalism, racial origin, cultural diversity, wealth or poverty, political systems or religious hatred. Nor did he envisage the goal of that society of peoples to be a balance of power maintaining the equilibrium of greater and lesser. In his pregnant phrase, it is full-scale unity in Christ. A georeligion centered and dependent on Christ: This is what Paul presented as the underlying framework for the ideal internationalism. In his context, Paul could have justifiably used that hybrid word "geopolitics," for he was speaking of a *geopoliteia*, one truly geopolitical structure for all mankind as one race.

Paul, as often happened, was the intelligent and perceptive formulator of a doctrine that would be taught and propagated to all peoples and nations by another man, Peter the Great Fisherman, and by his successors over in Rome. Despite his obscurity and cruel death, Peter had been given the Keys of authority to teach all men and women, and to establish thus the *geopoliteia* Paul had announced as God's plan for all men. That authority was guaranteed by the blood Christ shed. Within the span of some three hundred years and the pontificates of thirty-two successors to Peter as Bishop of Rome and official holder of the Keys of this blood, the initial obscurity of the Holder's office had been shed; Peter's papacy now assumed an increasingly dominant role in the development of nations. The Pauline goal, the Christian *geopoliteia*, was the goal of that papacy.

It took that papacy and its institutional organization, the Roman Catholic Church, almost the whole of two thousand years to attain, in the concrete order, its status and condition of a georeligion. It took all that time and the ups and downs of 263 pontificates for the political philosophy and goals of that georeligion to be purified and purged of the cultural and civilizational accretions that along the road impeded the development of papal and Roman Catholic geopolitics.

At the close of two thousand years since Paul expressed the worldview of a genuine georeligion, the 264th successor to the obscure Great Fisherman reigns and governs in Rome as the titular head of that georeligion housed in a genuinely geopolitical structure. For John Paul II is not only

the spiritual head of a worldwide corpus of believers but also the chief executive of a sovereign state that is a recognized member of our late-twentieth-century society of states. With a political goal and structure? Yes, with a geopolitical goal and structure. For, in the final analysis, John Paul II as the claimant Vicar of Christ does claim to be the ultimate court of judgment on the society of states as a society.

One of the eye-opening factors enhancing John Paul II as a prime world leader has been precisely the striking appearance of a genuinely political capability on the part of his Holy See, hitherto—and for some hundreds of years—regarded as an institution that should exercise whatever influence it exercises exclusively in the strictly “religious” and “spiritual” spheres. A wall stood—or should stand—between “Church” and “State.”

The Noriega interlude of late 1989 was the most recent eye-opener. U.S. Army authorities, the Bush administration, and the ten or fifteen Latin American governments involved in that Caribbean standoff emerged from its successful conclusion with a totally revamped concept of John Paul's Vatican. His Vatican men, clerics all of them, displayed not merely a detailed grasp of the issues clustered around the refugee Panamanian strongman, but a sophisticated approach to the diplomatic, military, governmental, and political problems that bristled around the Holy See's Panama City embassy. Whether in regard to Papal Nuncio Laboa, his two principal aides there, or the relevant officers in the Vatican's “Second Section” (for Relations with States)—Archbishop Angelo Sodano, the “foreign minister,” Archbishop Edward Cassidy, Vice-Secretary of State, Monsignor Giacinto Berlocco, special emissary, or the other in-house experts—the evolution in everybody's concept of the Holy See was quite manifest. One of the chief military spokesmen, General Maxwell Thurman, on his first appearance before newsmen referred to Archbishop Laboa as “some sort of ambassador.” But, in the heel of the hunt, when announcing Noriega's capitulation, the General referred deferentially and correctly to “Papal Nuncio Archbishop José Sebastian Laboa,” whose “professionalism” the General praised.

“These men didn't go around sprinkling Holy Water and shaking Rosaries,” one military aide commented. “Actually, they led us to a solution.” In the end, all concerned—Panamanians in their fears and desire for vengeance, Latin American diplomats accustomed to the slippery slopes of compromise, the Americans bent on “Operation Just Cause”—uniformly agreed that John Paul's men never allowed the moral issue to be lost in the scuffle between Noriega's supporters, his Panamanian enemies, and the righteous wrath of the U.S. expeditionary force.

Nobody from all three groups even thought for a moment that John

Paul's Holy See "should have nothing to do with such purely secular and state matters," as one Paul Blanshard-style East Coast commentator remarked.

The second thrust at a concrete goal beyond and transcending mere internationalism came from the brain of the most outstanding fanatic and zealot and the greatest organizing genius in ten centuries: V. I. Lenin. Conceived in that twisted mind, born in the carnage and cruelty of the Marxist takeover of Czarist Russia, that second attempt became embodied in the greatest hybrid political creation of all world history: the Party-State of the USSR.

Never a nation in any accepted sense of the word, nor an empire as we have known empires to be, the USSR was put together in the form of a state but uniquely designed and built to vehicle the Leninist-Marxist political takeover of all other states on the waves of an expectedly world-wide proletarian revolution. That is a thoroughly geopolitical goal, housed in a designedly geopolitical structure. Lenin and his successors built that geopolitical structure. Housing no religion, it houses an ideology that undeniably is a geo-ideology.

What many in the West find difficult to separate is the facade of national identity—the USSR as a member nation in the society of nations—and the Party-State of Lenin's building and design that exists and operates behind it. It is a troika of the CPSU, the Red Army and the KGB. Its *raison d'être* and sole goal is not the well-being of the inhabitants of the USSR but the ideological aim of all loyal and genuine Leninist-Marxists: a Marxist geopolitical structure spanning all the nations and peoples of the globe.

The possession, the nurturing and the advancement of that geopolitical structure, in addition to the rather rare mentality it has engendered in the Soviets, constitute a first and important parallel between John Paul II and Mikhail Gorbachev. But the parallel goes further.

Not only are both of these men Slavs and both of them heads of the only models of geopolitical organization available for us when we examine the society of nations and states today in its trend to a new world order that must be something more than a merely Internationalist or even Transnationalist structure. Both of these powerful world leaders have chosen to gamble.

Papa Wojtyla decided very early on in his pontificate that the geopolitical should receive the burden of his attention and be the focus of his papal activity. He would hew out for himself a special place in world affairs, while tending to the shambles of his own institution in only a marginal fashion. He was and is gambling, not only on the durability of

his Church—that it could survive the continually growing shambles—but on the objective he had chosen for his papacy—that he could play an integral part in the geopolitical formation of the society of nations.

Mikhail Gorbachev, for his part, has severely modified and adapted the Leninist Marxism of the USSR, no longer pursuing the strategy hallowed, as it were, by the two greatest figures in the seventy-three-year-old history of that Party-State, Lenin and Stalin; he has set out to mold the structure and goals of that Party-State to the form passionately recommended by Communism's greatest but unsung hero, the Sardinian Antonio Gramsci.

No Marxist theoretician ever analyzed the proper geopolitical stance and strategy of the Leninist-Marxist Party-State more intelligently than he had done. Gramsci unerringly laid his finger on the only strategy that could possibly ensure a total victory of the Party-State through a worldwide proletarian revolution.

He purified the (to Marxists) sacred term "proletariat" of the nineteenth-century, outmoded meaning every leader from Karl Marx to Yuri Andropov stupidly accepted. Primarily, what is needed is not political penetration of capitalist countries, nor military superiority, Gramsci said, but corruption of their Christian cultural basis.

Gramsci proposed a new form of Marxization: Reduce all men's expectations of any salvation from on high—in art, in literature, in science, in medicine, in social works, in politics, in finance, in commerce, in industry. Promise all men liberation from what ails them by means of heightened human—and only human—effort by intellectual, emotional, scientific, ethical, means. Instruct them that all hope of progress lies within themselves.

Unerringly, too, Gramsci brought into sharp relief the fundamental postulate of Marxism: its total and thorough materialism. But this, Gramsci pointed out, will provide the common ground Marxists can share with capitalists in the West. Join them, Gramsci exhorted his fellow Communists. Participate in their profit-seeking, in their social "do-gooding," in their international peace-making and peace-keeping structures, in their art movements, in their literary efforts, in their efforts to raise health standards and living standards, and yes, even in their profession of ethical and religious goals. Become members of the global home they are building, genuine members of their human family, collaborating in liberating all men from slavery and the meaninglessness of daily life.

All this, but under one major proviso. Let the entire effort be solely by man for man's sake. Collaborate to fill his belly with fresh food and to fill his mind with a fresh knowledge. But make sure he believes both food

and knowledge are his creation, the results only of his own noble efforts. Make sure man never repeats the famous cry of German philosopher Martin Heidegger: "I know that only God can save us." In 1989, the new leader of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel, would tell his countrymen: "In organizational decrees, it is truly difficult to find that God is the only one who can save us." Mikhail Gorbachev, as Gramsci's disciple, would say: "Make sure no one listens to Havel."

Gorbachev's gamble is with the durability of the Party-State: that it can last through a period of territorial retrenchment and exposure to all the allurements of capitalism and Western democracy. The gamble is worth taking, he thinks, because of the geopolitical prize at stake.

Any worthwhile assessment and accurate estimation of these two men, Karol Wojtyla and Mikhail Gorbachev, must start from this geopolitical premise. Both men think and plan geopolitically. They do not see the world's nations as diverse and divergent groups of men and women who are learning with difficulty to get along together, or merely as an assemblage of powers who must modify and adapt their resources in order to survive. Each man, in his own way, presumes—assumes would be a better word—that the diversity and divergence are accidents of human history, that in reality all are finally being driven by a force greater than the force any one or several of them can muster. In his authentic Leninist Marxism, with its crass materialism, Gorbachev recognizes this force as blind historical destiny. In his genuine Roman Catholicism, Papa Wojtyla believes this is the power of Jesus Christ as head of the whole human race.

They differ profoundly on this fundamental point. But they are one in the vantage point from which they start: the totality of nations, their different tendencies and weaknesses as part of that totality. Without an appreciation of that unique geopolitical vantage point, it is not possible to understand the moves they make, the turns and twists in their strategies; and, because of their undoubted influence on international affairs, it would be difficult to plot the trajectory the society of nations will follow in the present decade as they progress toward what all envision as a new world order.

The two main vehicles of that progress are, obviously, the interdependence of single nations and the generalized decision and wish to undergo development. Distances, not merely geographical but economic and cultural, have narrowed between nations. For, every year, that economic interdependence intensifies as a means of development. To facilitate that

interdependence, political differences and contentions are being diluted and weakened by enlightened self-interest. The current outstanding example of this necessary narrowing of political distances is provided by the 1988-89 changes in the political structures of the Soviet satellite nations and, to some small extent, in the political structure of the USSR itself. Even national prerogatives—say, a country's currency—are being curtailed, modified, abolished, as presently planned for the European Economic Community of 1992+. Already, it is safe to say that the outlook in the society of nations as a whole is more intensely oriented to the international side of life than ever before. Under the impetus of the desire for development, this international attitude is being transformed into a transnational and globalist outlook according as interdependence gives birth to joint efforts and multilateral participation in mutually beneficial projects.

But that progress toward a new world order is stimulated not only by the desire for development and the demands of interdependence. Today, for the first time in history, the whole human race is facing geo-issues: the choice between peace and nuclear destruction of this planet's civilization; the deteriorating environment of the globe itself as a human habitat; and single-theme issues like the scourge of AIDS, the proliferation of drugs and widespread famine. None of these can be solved by any one nation without the cooperation of all others. For all, in their territories and their peoples, are deeply threatened in these issues. From these causes alone, a globalism would have to be born.

This new globalism is often discussed with a liberal use of the terms "geopolitics" and "geopolitical." But, to be very accurate, what is being discussed is the internationalism of the ancient Greeks with a small admixture of their cosmopolitanism—this last item rather as a matter of whimsy or poetic license on the part of some globalists.

Those who indulge in no whimsy, but are bent on themselves creating the new world order, speak as if that new order went far beyond international collaboration, association and commingling transnationally on the basis of democratic egalitarianism as it has evolved in the individual Western democracies. But the Fukuyama interdict bans them from any explicit and detailed description of that new order. For Francis Fukuyama was correct: Out of the present internationalism there cannot come any level of thought and structure beyond what democratic egalitarianism supplies. What lies far beyond that level of perception and structure cannot be supplied by the most thorough internationalism and the most ardent transnationalism.

The fact of international life today is that we are in the middle of an

intensely globalist period, and none of our political structures, national or international, are geopolitical. We do not possess the structure suitable or necessary for housing a geopolitical society of nations and states. Until such is created, all we can have, and do increasingly have, is a society of ever more interdependent nations linked by ever more numerous agreements between single units in that society.

That key term "geopolitical," in fact, refers primarily to structure, and only secondarily to the ideology, the spirit or ethos (democratic capitalism, Leninist Marxism, or other), infusing that structure. At the present stage of our human experience, we can arrive at a somewhat satisfactory idea of the geopolitical by starting with the structure we have known for a long time: the political.

To be geopolitical, a structure would have to be equipped with legislative, executive and judicial powers over all its inhabitants—and, in this case, that means all the nations. The creation and successful exercise of those powers depends on the unity within which all the inhabitants live. We do not yet know—we cannot even imagine with our fantasy or reason with our minds—what the principle of that unity could be, for all our political unities have been based on common territory, common racial origin, common language, even common religion or—its pale image—common ideology. And all those political unities—nations, states, "countries," or "powers," we sometimes call them—rest on apparently inviolable principles of human rights arising from a multiplicity of differences (linguistic, territorial, cultural, racial).

While, as Fukuyama pointed out, "democratic egalitarianism" is leavening all these different unities that make up the society of nations, nothing deriving from that same "democratic egalitarianism" in itself gives any opening for a consideration of a geopolitical structure within which all the different member states could be politically assimilated to one model. For that furthest reach of our political thought presupposes *national* unities. What could be the principle of the geopolitical unity necessary for a truly viable geopolitical structure? The Fukuyama interdict is a two-edged sword cleaving our present from our past but also clearly cutting us from any future based on "democratic egalitarianism" and its political base.

In all our recorded human experience and within the bounds of our reason, we cannot find any satisfactory answer about the principle of geopolitical unity. Our pathway to such an answer is blocked by the way we think, perceive and form judgments about that very familiar category of human grouping we call a nation or a state. The way we think about it is ingrained from centuries of experience.

When the upheavals in Romania freed the population from the iron grip of the Nicolae Ceaușescu government, the desire for change and for a new political structure washed over Romania's eastern border into Soviet Moldavia (part of Romania before Soviet-forced annexation in 1944). One of the Moldavian dissidents, Oazug Nantoy, expressed the terrible difficulty that now arose for Romanians and Moldavians: how to invent national Moldavian politics on the grass-roots level after so many years of Stalinism. "The worst we still have from the Stalin era," said Nantoy, "is the way we think. We cannot obtain new thinking on credit."

On the much broader and worldwide plane occupied by the society of nations, there is the same difficulty. Leaders and statesmen, as well as Transnationalist entrepreneurs and Internationalist activists, have inherited a way of thinking about international relations that of itself precludes them from thinking geopolitically. It would be a mighty feat of reason and imagination for them to unthink—to free themselves from—the framework of those relations within which they have lived and thought and planned heretofore, and which is the spontaneously accepted way in which they understand all that is transpiring around them in our world. Unfortunately, as Nantoy remarked apropos of his fellow Moldavians, they cannot obtain "new thinking on credit."

It is relatively simple to state in so many words what geopolitics implies theoretically. It is very difficult to think in a practical fashion about the society of nations geopolitically and to understand the hard-fact implications of a geopolitical structure housing those same nations. Hence, it is very difficult for most moderns to understand what John Paul II and Mikhail Gorbachev are about.

Both these leaders are geopolitically minded, and they are both dealing with their individual situations from a geopolitical standpoint and with a geopolitical goal in view. Their statements and actions, their weaving in and out through current events, the welter of facts about them, and the wealth of international commentary on them, all this has a geopolitical thread running through it that is hard to unravel. Geopolitics is, at one and the same time, so grandiose in its assumptions, so broad in its worldwide implications, and yet so dependent on such a complicated machinery, that it lies outside the scope of our normal thinking modes.

Yet, if there is any one overall identifiable trend of international relationships today, it surely is geopolitical. Even before Western leaders officially joined this trend, they already were conniving at it. Now that the geopolitical trend has become an active element in our world, there

is a "new thinking" abroad—again, on credit from that prime agent of change Mikhail Gorbachev.

## 20. Diplomatic Connivance

At the earliest stages of any deep change in international affairs, there is a time-honored practice that governs the behavior of the great powers of the world. One of the most successful practitioners of that approach—the eighteenth-century French adventurer-statesman, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand—artfully called that secretive process *la connivance diplomatique*. Diplomatic connivance.

Intelligent and farseeing statesmen who contemplate a brusque departure from an established policy, Talleyrand maintained, will keep the public mind and reaction of their nations in view. Consequently, long before they reveal their new policy, they will carry on a private dialogue among themselves, exploring the most sensitive and delicate aspects of their plans.

In the privacy of diplomatic chanceries, in highly classified correspondence, in privileged person-to-person communications, agreements of substance and principle are reached. Agreements about how far each participant is willing to commit itself; about what the overall timing will be; about who other than the main parties should be informed; and about the main steps by which the general public is to be acquainted with the planned change.

Precisely that process had been in operation for more than three years before Mikhail Gorbachev began his tenure as General Secretary of the CPSU in March of 1985, bringing with him changes of a truly shocking nature and extent.

By the time Gorbachev came to the top of the Soviet heap, in fact, knowledge of what was about to come had already begun to filter from